





CONTROL CONFLICTS  
INVOLVING  
THE MILITARY OFFICER

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May 1960

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Thus the artless song I sing  
Does not deal with anything  
New or never said before - 1  
.....

Our Government is built on a sensitive structure of checks-and-balances. Its keystone—the Constitution—cleverly divides permissive and restrictive powers, and distributes these to the three branches of Government. The framers of this remarkable document knew too well the dangers of unbridled authority; they had waged a revolution against it. Dearly had they bought their opportunity to build a new nation.

One would not expect such a system to function in complete harmony. As expected, since human attitudes, opinions, drives, and actions are involved, conflicts often arise. When they occur, they may be resolved by compromise, consent, use of authority, use of power, or by other means. The action taken on conflicts depends on the point in the government process that the conflict takes place, the issues involved, and the individual responsible and empowered to exert authority.

One of the most elusive and difficult points to remember about the nature of conflicts is that they always occur between individuals.<sup>2</sup> A branch

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<sup>1</sup>Rudyard Kipling, "General Summary," Rudyard Kipling, Vol. III, (n.p., n.n., n.d.), p. 385.

<sup>2</sup>A. Lawrence Lowell, Conflicts of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 13.



of government cannot, of itself, be in conflict with anything. Always an issue can be reduced to a conflict of attitudes, ideas, opinions and desires between responsible individuals. Organizations are nothing more than people working in a structured relationship. Ideas, attitudes, opinions and desires do not exist except in the minds of men.<sup>3</sup>

Approaching any study from the conflict viewpoint requires a delicacy that often loses its flavor when placed on the written page. One feels freer to criticize organizations than to criticize people, unless the people are no longer living. Because of this difficulty this paper often lapses into the never-never land where branches of government seem to have brains, military organizations seem to have attitudes, and departments speak. Rest assured that this is not true. This is a tale of conflict; the participants are not organizations, but dedicated men, acting within organizational structures.

It is my purpose to explore these conflicts, starting with the nature of all conflicts and working toward an understanding of the development of current conflicts of immediate importance to the military man.

But take caution, conflicts are not of themselves evidence of a faulty system.<sup>4</sup> Nor do they constitute evidence of a hopeless deadlock. For every conflict there are agreements. We would not expect dedicated men with differing duties and experiences always to be of one mind while operating within a government framework consisting of divided powers.

This is an examination of the origin and nature of conflicts. It is a study of those which are of greatest impact today. It is an attempt to help the reader understand the issues and dangers involved. With this understanding, the issues in conflict, as well as the personal interests of the participants, can be recognized.

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<sup>3</sup>William Ernest Hocking, Preface to Philosophy: Textbook (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 46.

<sup>4</sup>Lowell, loc. cit.





This age of conflict calls for wisdom, patience, and understanding. There is a time for circumventing and a time for facing conflicts which cannot be circumvented. In either case, this paper will assist the reader in understanding and resolving his own conflicts.



## CHAPTER II

### THE NATURE OF CONFLICTS

#### Introduction

Conflict is defined as a strife for mastery, a clash or a divergence.<sup>5</sup> We shall be concerned with the divergence of opinions and attitudes of individuals and their overt manifestations in a clash or strife for mastery somewhere in the government process.

#### Conflicts Involve Attitudes and Opinions<sup>6</sup>

An old proverb states that "it takes two to make an argument." Even the most happily married man would not disagree, but "two" of what? Essentially it takes two people, each with his own attitude toward a certain thing, and these two attitudes seem irreconcilable. Argument is an overt expression of conflict of attitudes and should have some purpose, which may be:

1. To communicate the attitude. In Government this might be known as "stating a position."
2. To persuade the other person. Again this may take the form of expanding or elaborating on one's stated position to show that it is "right."
3. To persuade authority or public opinion. This purpose is quite evident during an election year.

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<sup>5</sup>Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1958).

<sup>6</sup>Lowell, loc. cit.





## Conflicts Involve People<sup>7</sup>

Organizations are people. A disciplined organization may appear to have a mind of its own, but this is not true. It may appear to be so because the customs, traditions, rules, and directives adopted by or imposed upon the members create an atmosphere of unity. Individually the members may have different viewpoints, but they act in a disciplined manner for many reasons:

1. They have confidence in their superior and themselves.
2. They desire to avoid personal responsibility for acting otherwise.
3. They fear sanctions that may be imposed by superiors or the law.
4. They believe in the ultimate objectives even if they may disagree with methods.<sup>8</sup>

The reader should view this from the opposite point of view also. If a superior-subordinate conflict should arise, such as certain examples that will be described, within the executive branch, non-conformity, or insubordinate action, could result from:

1. Lack of confidence in the superior
2. Lack of self-confidence
3. Willingness to assume responsibility for non-conformist actions
4. Disregard of sanctions or law
5. Inability to align personal beliefs with the objectives or methods required.

## Conflicts Involve Values, Ethics and Law<sup>9</sup>

If one accepts the premise that most men are dedicated to certain principles, basically honest, law abiding and forthright, then this premise

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Richard N. Owens, Introduction to Business Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1954), pp. 104-106.

<sup>9</sup>Lowell, op. cit., chaps. i, vii, xi.



should apply doubly for government servants. The human element of conflict in Government springs from the fact that men have different conceptions of what is "right," "wrong," "good for the Nation," "top priority," "legal," "democratic," or "communistic."<sup>10</sup> Not only can individuals conflict in their opinions with each other, but also a great deal of self-conflict can arise when the government servant is faced with deciding whether he should take the only course which he considers "right" and "for the good of the Nation," when he also believes it to be "unethical."

Our Constitution, born out of a violent period, left a good deal of room for conflict, short of bloodshed, in government processes. The framers of the Constitution realized that men will always hold different values, loyalties, and judgments. Understanding this, they wisely separated powers so that the attempt of any one individual to impose his values on the country could be checked to some degree. So we were given law, born out of conflict, recognizing the value of agreement. But the law also assures that if there is disagreement between the branches of government, such disagreement may be heard and, if strong enough, check the intentions of the other branch, within the law.

#### Conflicts Involve Uncertainty

Not only are values important, but the relative importance of one value over another, or one government program over another, is constantly being weighed. If the President, Congress and the military possessed all the facts on an issue, could portend the future, and had the wisdom of Solomon, they might never disagree. Neither the present nor the future is seen in the same light by men, nor do men possess infinite wisdom. Nevertheless, they are

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<sup>10</sup>A. Craig Baird, General Speech (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), chap. x.





constantly required to make decisions<sup>11</sup> involving the future of the country with a minimum of information at hand. As an example, consider military expenditures. Approximately fifty-seven percent of government spending is for national defense. How can the wisdom of this huge amount be judged? Not even hindsight can tell us what would have happened if the money had not been spent. Nor do we have complete information to enable us to choose between alternate programs today. Our Nation's future rests in the hands of men who have the courage to make decisions in the face of uncertainty.

### Conflicts Involve Loyalties<sup>12</sup>

In a superior-subordinate relationship, such as we find in Government and in the military service, loyalties are pretty well defined by law and custom in the lower echelons. However, as the Government pyramid gets closer to the people (Washington), loyalties become somewhat confused in the minds of responsible individuals. Consider the head of a military department, commissioned to obey the orders of the President. He has been trained to give unswerving loyalty to his superiors. He has sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution. He has also been trained to speak his opinion until a decision has been reached, at which time he should diligently carry out his orders without regard to his opinion.<sup>13</sup> He has also been trained that loyalty is a two-way proposition extending from superior to subordinate and vice versa.<sup>14</sup>

Place this military officer in a congressional hearing regarding appropriations or the Defense Department reorganization. Where does his loyalty lie? In the hearing, decisions regarding his future and the future of

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<sup>11</sup>William A. Reitzel, "Decision Making—A Primary Executive Responsibility," lecture before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C., September 28, 1959.

<sup>12</sup>Lowell, op. cit., chap. xii.

<sup>13</sup>Department of the Army Field Manual FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Procedure (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), chap. i.

<sup>14</sup>Army General School Special Text No. 1, Leadership for the Company Officer (Fort Riley, Kansas, n.n., 1950), chap. i.





his department will be made by Congress which has the constitutional authority to raise and support the Army and Navy, as well as to publish regulations governing them.<sup>15</sup> The military man is placed in the conflicting situation in which he may be accused of insubordination by his superior if he does not support the President's program.<sup>16</sup> At the same time his superior does not have the power of decision.<sup>17</sup> Within the law, the secretary of a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may bring matters before Congress.<sup>18</sup> This has been dubbed "legal insubordination" by the executive branch.<sup>19</sup> Is it a good definition? Even the words are in conflict!

#### Conflicts Involve Communications

A conflict of opinions comes to nothing if it remains in the mind of the dissenter. Modern communication techniques can quickly widen the scope of a government conflict and make it "the business of the people." Depending on the use of communications, the conflict may either stay within normal bounds or assume nationwide significance and importance. Military men, such as "Billy" Mitchell and General MacArthur, chose to throw their conflicts on the world sounding board. They met with more drastic discipline within the executive branch than that meted out to those who are merely "legally insubordinate." They chose to circumvent the customary communications chain.

#### Conflicts Involve Time and Space

An old military "stock answer" used in responding to academic tactical questions is: "That depends on the situation and the terrain." Useful

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<sup>15</sup>U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 8.

<sup>16</sup>"Defense Organization," Armed Forces Management, November, 1959, p. 25.

<sup>17</sup>U. S. Constitution, loc. cit.

<sup>18</sup>U. S. National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401), sec. 202.

<sup>19</sup>Armed Forces Management, loc.cit.





as an answer, it does not solve problems. The military man who waits for a complete picture of the situation and the terrain will wait until he is defeated.

Like other government officials, the military man must make decisions, viewing the situation and the terrain through a misty window. His hope is that his decisions, forcefully carried out, will be the best to meet a changing situation and place him in an advantageous position for future goals.

Situations constantly change. An answer for the problems of today may be completely useless for similar future problems as time changes perspectives. The situation may change slowly or abruptly. Generals Lee and Grant at Appomattox would have used, one day before the surrender, whatever means each had to destroy the other. Once the retreat of Lee's army was blocked, both men saw the conditions and duties of peace as being much different from those of war.<sup>20</sup>

#### Conflicts Rarely Involve Absolutes<sup>21</sup>


Men do not argue over black and white. Conflicts occur in the gray regions where one man sees more black and the other more white. Coupling this concept with the influences of time and space, one can see that he who holds to a principle which solved a problem five years ago may meet head-on with one who holds to a contradictory principle suitable for five years hence. Which one is right for today?

Compare this to the problem of budgeting for military weapons. Is it any wonder that there should be disagreement over which weapons should receive prime consideration? Who can say what is right for today or the future? Nevertheless, the decision must be made, in changing times, in the face of uncertainty.

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<sup>20</sup>Lowell, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., chap. 1.



## Conflicts Involve Principles With Limits<sup>22</sup>

A favorite technique of joke writers is to take a principle held to be good and "stretch" it to absurdity. Thus "cooperation" could reach the extreme of "two Chinamen doing each others laundry." Changing times often cause orthodox government decisions to reach ridiculous extremes. A government department or military organization, built on limited, inflexible principles, can become expensive and unnecessary as time stretches these limits. Temperance, legally installed beyond its limits, as prohibition, became a governmental liability. We believe in free competition, but we apply anti-trust limitations on those who become too "successful" at freely competing when they restrict the freedom of others. Personal liberty is limited by certain police powers.

The application of limited principles can be seen in fiscal policy where the limited principle of budget balancing has given way to the limited principle of proximate balance.<sup>23</sup> The limits of this principle seem to have been exceeded also as deficit spending continues in good times and bad.

Problems faced in choosing a proper Defense Department organization and the management of new weapons systems also indicate that time, technology, and space have snapped the limits of old principles, and new ones must take their place.<sup>24</sup>

## Conflicts Involve Conceptual Skills

Not only do principles have limits, but individual minds—shaped by education and experience—view problems in a different frame of reference.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> John A. Beckett, "The Processes and Critical Issues of the Federal Budget," The Controller, June, 1959, p. 282.

<sup>24</sup> Armed Forces Management, loc. cit.

<sup>25</sup> Lowell, op. cit., chap. xiii.





Not only are men limited by incomplete information, but the information they do have is colored by their viewpoint. Individual minds are limited in their ability to understand given information. Thoughts lose their cogency because of the problems of semantics in communication.

In the governmental processes, differing conceptions of the same problem create some of the hottest conflicts.

Consider a piece of legislation. The President sees it as good because it is "good for the Nation." The congressman sees it as "bad" because it will throw 10,000 voters from his district out of work. The Supreme Court views it as bad because it is "illegal." Each branch views a different facet and pronounces judgment.

For men to be of accord, a common conception of a problem requires a great deal of communication and instruction.<sup>26</sup> History is replete with examples of failures of projects due to the incomplete concept of a particular problem. If General Stuart had shared General Lee's conceptions, Gettysburg might not have been a Southern defeat.<sup>27</sup> If General Jackson had told his generals his future plans at Chancellorsville, the Union defeat there might have been complete.<sup>28</sup>

A need for better conceptual skills exists in Government today. This is especially true in the Department of Defense. Rapid evolutions and technological advances bring on conflicts, many of which could be solved by broader knowledge. Organization structures and control measures can hinder or assist in the development of conception.

So-called "inter-service rivalries" are caused by differences in conceptual skills. This can be attributed simply to a difference in

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<sup>26</sup> Joseph Peleg, "Controller Communications with Top Management," The Controller, April, 1959, p. 159.

<sup>27</sup> Fletcher Pratt, Ordeal by Fire (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p. 216.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 194.





occupations.<sup>29</sup> But there is a danger to the country if one conception should reign supreme. The defeat of the Spanish Armada shows that a splendidly equipped army cannot win a naval battle. The charge of "parochialism" that the President has recently hurled at certain military men indicates that he regards their conception as limited and narrow. Although the issue over which the charge arose will not be judged, an important point to remember is that specialized study may increase knowledge; but it may not increase wisdom, mental balance and the ability to find the right limit between conflicting opinions.<sup>30</sup>

There is always danger of misconception when one fails to completely investigate and understand the opinions of others before he passes judgment on them, or before he "takes a stand" on a certain problem. Politicians can afford themselves the luxury of fighting things they do not understand. The military departments should not make that mistake. History has shown that each needs the other more than the Nation needs any one in its present form. World War II was won by each Service providing support for the other and the understanding of common problems by men of conception. This should not be forgotten in times of peace.

### Conclusion

Our Government was formed with the knowledge that conflicts always will arise but that they should not go uncontrolled. One cannot moralize or say that conflicts are in themselves good or bad. Evolution may bring on conflicts or conflicts may bring on evolution. As long as men differ in experience, heredity, environment, association, reasoning ability, and education, they can be expected to have differing conceptions of any problem. Further, they may conflict on equal terms or on superior-subordinate terms. Conflicts

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<sup>29</sup>Lowell, loc cit.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 150-151.





come about by change when old principles no longer fit a new situation.

There is a need for conflict as well as a lack of conflict. Conflicts may bring about change more rapidly and yet the widening of the scope of a conflict outside the bounds of custom or law may hurt national prestige. For this reason, men with broad conceptual knowledge are necessary in Government. Although specialization is required, a specialist can be dangerous if he cannot conceive a total problem. Communication and an attempt at understanding can eliminate or make unnecessary many government conflicts.



## CHAPTER III

### THE ARENA OF CONFLICT

#### Introduction

Our Nation might be compared to a many-ringed circus with its people as both the performers and the audience. The rings overlap. The controlling ring is the Government containing the ringmaster and two equally large rings each of which checks the other. Not only do the rings overlap, but they contain smaller rings. The people jump from one ring to another, try to expand the ring they happen to be in, and jump in and out of the Government ring. The show is confusing, viewed as a whole, but the performers own the show and would not have it otherwise. Since they can see only a few rings at a time they are usually most concerned with those surrounding them. Bearing in mind the nature of conflicts, let us see if we can view some of these conflicts as they involve the Nation—the large arena—and specifically the Government which is the controlling ring.

#### The People

The people individually are fine folks, like you and I. But they, like we, are in conflict within themselves and with other people and groups. They feel that Government should place more restrictions on others, but allow them more freedom.<sup>31</sup> Individually, they find that they can do little about freeing themselves and imposing their wills on the Government and others.

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<sup>31</sup>Elmer B. Staats, "The Government Sector of the American Economy," The American Political Science Review, March, 1953, p. 84.





There are representatives in Congress, however, who have a greater degree of power, so the people join pressure groups and political parties to exert influence on their representatives. To a certain degree their representative will respond to the will of the people.

The Government influences the people to a great degree. Its many forces influence the: national economy, standard of living, health, educational level, transportation, communication, and income of the citizen. The complete effect of government on the people is hard to measure and difficult to comprehend. That the people sometimes fail to grasp the significance of the complete interaction of government is understandable. That they should not be interested is inexcusable. Those who are not interested in government are not interested in themselves.

#### Public Opinion<sup>32</sup>

A slogan of the middle ages was, "vox populi, vox Dei," (The voice of the people [is] the voice of God). Public opinion has been misconstrued many times. Just as an organization is not a living thing with a mind of its own, neither is a "public" a living thing. A public consists of people; public opinion, in its broadest aspect, means that the majority asserts, and the minority ungrudgingly accepts, opinion toward a certain subject.

There is a real power in public opinion. It gives sanction to or drops support of laws, such as it did with prohibition. It sustains social agencies and institutions such as organizations, churches, and schools. It upholds social and moral standards and it vitalizes public morale.

Public opinion can override conflicts, for any program or attitude is valueless without public support. The mere existence of a known opinion can prevent, strengthen, or quickly quell a governmental conflict. For this

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<sup>32</sup>Benjamin H. Williams, The Economics of National Security, Vol. III, Public Support, Morale, Security (Washington, D. C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1958).





reason, those who wish to make their conflicts a public issue make a habit of doing so with their "ear to the ground." They also attempt to educate the public by widely broadcasting their viewpoints.

Public opinion, though often hasty, is overwhelming in its immediacy. Since it is informal in nature, it reaches beyond written laws in influencing behavior and affecting personal opinion; therefore its influence is greater than law, which must wait for debate and action. It is less mechanical than law and adjusts itself to all situations. While law hesitates to strike at motives, public opinion is quick to pass judgment on individual motives. It can be seen, then, that public opinion is perhaps the greatest controlling element in public conflict situations.

### Pressure Groups<sup>33</sup>

A pressure group is a minority public that acts through lobbying or propaganda to force or defeat legislation or alter public opinion. This is done by concerted pressure upon legislatures and public opinion. Different pressure groups often have different motives, but each is certain that its claims are made in the "public interest."

The success of pressure groups depends to a large degree on the public's or legislature's acceptance of their representation. Recent lampooning of the resolutions adopted by the Daughters of the American Revolution [DAR] would indicate that their pressure is not blowing any "pop-valves" either in Congress or on the street.

The effect of pressure groups on the public depends on the acceptance by the public. The effect on Congress depends to a large degree on whether the Congressman believes that the objectives of pressure groups represent the objectives of the public he represents.

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.





## Congress

Congress is the great pulse of public opinion. Lord Bryce claimed that in America the most valuable index to public opinion is the popular election.<sup>34</sup> This is rather vague because one man may stand for many things, but Congressmen are certainly interested in public opinion as expressed by the press, radio, television, and public opinion polls.

It is in Congress that the conflicts of the people begin to affect National Government. Consider the following:

1. The people want more government benefits and fewer taxes. Although current fiscal theories of proximate balance hold that a period of prosperity should occasion an excess of revenue over government spending, deficit spending is the rule of the day. Congress spends for the people and delays the payment.<sup>35</sup>

2. Legislation currently is directed on lines favoring the four major groups with great political power: business, labor, agriculture, and veterans.<sup>36</sup> The group representing the aged may even overshadow the veterans as years of peace accumulate.

Congressmen must carry within themselves the conflicting desires of the people they represent. As they gain experience these conflicts become more vivid. They learn that local interests are often in contradiction with the national welfare.<sup>37</sup> A Congressman who is faced with deciding for or against an issue that will benefit his constituents to the detriment of the Nation has a weighty decision to make.

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Staats, loc. cit.

<sup>36</sup> Ernest S. Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role (New York: New York University Press, 1956), p. 124.

<sup>37</sup> Congressman William Bates, lecture before the Navy Graduate Comptrollership Class, The George Washington University, Washington, D. C., April 27, 1960.



To simplify the Congressman's interests, they might be categorized as:

1. Keeping his job
2. Serving his constituents
3. Serving his country.

The conflicting nature of these interests would lead one to wonder how any one man could serve over one term and preserve his sanity. Furthermore, one would query how any man with self-esteem could perform all three and still sleep at night. Surprisingly enough, the great men who have served a significant portion of their lives on the "Hill" have learned to "play the political game" and earn the respect of the public as well. They have learned early to see the two sides of every conflict, to accept conflicting principles as they exist, and to engage in conflicts with spirit and a philosophical attitude, protecting those values which they consider most important.

#### The President

If the Congressman's conscience bothers him, when he places local interests before those which he considers best for the Nation, he can reassure himself with the thought that the founding fathers recognized the need for someone to represent local interests and hence established Congress. Although Congress, as a whole, represents the Nation, the individual Congressman represents only a segment. The President is the one man on whom the praise and blame for national accomplishments can be placed. As such, he must resolve the conflicting interests of the people into policy within the law. His powers have expanded with the tremendous growth of government activities, the need for direction and leadership in policy and legislation, and the quick successions of national crises.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Frederick A. Ogg and P. Norman Ray, American Government (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), chap. xxi.







Not only does the President have broad powers, but he has certain limitations which often bring him into direct conflict with Congress.

### Legislative-Executive Conflict

Congress and the President are in agreement on urgent issues, or those which command common loyalty.<sup>39</sup> On other matters, conflicts are centered around differences of opinion and attempts of one branch to trespass on the other's authority. Each branch has its own responsibility over which it maintains jealous surveillance. On occasion one will use its authority to limit or thwart the intentions of the other.<sup>40</sup>

The most obvious Presidential powers are the veto and power of appointment. On certain occasions Congress, peculiarly, can use the President's veto to win votes at home by voting for measures they are certain the President will veto.

The President can exercise patronage or black-listing both on a personal or geographic scale. Geographic patronage can affect the military when military construction is used by the executive branch to secure support of or opposition to certain measures.

Congress has the power of the purse.<sup>41</sup> The President can accomplish little without financing. Congress can use this power particularly well by specifically itemizing, restricting, and limiting the amounts and manner in which appropriations can be spent. The President cannot exercise an item veto on these bills, and Congress, realizing this, passes appropriation bills in such form and at such a late date that complete veto is highly unlikely.

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<sup>39</sup>Griffith, op. cit., chap. v.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., chap. iv.

<sup>41</sup>Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spending Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949).



While Congress can limit the President's financing, the President has the power to leave unused, or control by apportionment or expenditure, funds which Congress may desire to be spent.<sup>42</sup> The President, or executive agencies, if they feel that funds are entirely insufficient, may spend the entire amount prematurely and request additional funds. On one occasion, the Post Office Department did just this and Congress was forced to grant additional funds. Although Congress' wrath was loud and long, it was impotent against the tide of public opinion that would ensue should mail stand undelivered.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, almost every check or balance of one branch has an appropriate counter that can be exercised by the other. Unlike other forms of government, such as the Cabinet system, a Presidency can result in lingering conflicts between branches.<sup>44</sup>

One weapon of the President that Congress can do little about is the fact that the President is the President. The power of his prestige is enormous. The executive branch has also a vast accumulation of facts and experience to draw on.

Congress can investigate as well as appropriate. These powers frequently involve what has become known as the fourth branch of Government—the bureaucracy. The power of the purse or the threat of a congressional investigation can significantly alter the actions of a bureau. Congressional oversight of government operations can result in punitive or commendable results. On occasions, the executive branch has refused to honor requests for information by Congress, claiming executive privilege. Once, in the McGrain v. Daugherty case,<sup>45</sup> the Supreme Court declared that Congress did have the

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<sup>42</sup>Griffith, loc. cit.

<sup>43</sup>Wilmerding, op. cit., chap. vii.

<sup>44</sup>Ogg and Ray, loc. cit.

<sup>45</sup>Griffith, op. cit., p.32.







right to such information, not available elsewhere, in the aid of the legislative function. Although Congress may have the authority to request information, there would be little likelihood that the refusal to disclose information, if ordered by the President, would result in a contempt conviction because:

1. The executive department would be required to prosecute a member of the executive branch who was acting under Presidential order.
2. The President could pardon in advance. The only recourse in such a case might be for the Senate to order that a person be held. Wisely enough, neither branch has pushed such matters beyond the oratory stage.

Although these bureaus are often administered by the executive branch, the appointment of the bureau chief has been confirmed by Congress. Furthermore, the power of the purse and the investigative powers of Congress may exert considerable pressure on bureau members who wish to keep their jobs. Such devices as placing time limits on the life of agencies, or requiring certain action to be reviewed by congressional committees before approval, create a real conflict of loyalty on the part of department heads. So we find that not only do both branches block each other, but clever circumventions exist and have been used.

#### The Bureau of the Budget<sup>46</sup>

The Bureau of the Budget came into being in 1921 under the Budget and Accounting Act. In 1939 it was moved to the Executive Office of the President. Acting in the "shadow of the President," it speaks for him on matters concerning the budget. It reviews agency requirements and prepares the Presidential budget for his approval. It exercises control over budget

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<sup>46</sup>Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget; Its Evolution and Present Role," American Political Science Review, August, 1945, p. 653.



execution, determines apportionments, analyzes proposed legislation, and stimulates management and organization improvements. Over the years, the Bureau truly has become powerful in financial management, clearing of legislation, and Government organization matters.

The conflicts which center around the Bureau of the Budget are concerned with the duty of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as the budget advisor to the President, for formulating a budget within the framework of the national fiscal policy and the goals of the administration. If the President calls for a balanced budget, then the budget must approximate the Secretary of the Treasury's estimate of receipts. When the budget estimate must be cut to correspond with the receipts, the screaming begins. When a cut involves the military, resentment is felt by those who feel the Budget Director is not qualified to "direct military policy." Congress becomes incensed when the Budget Director impounds or does not apportion funds to support favorite projects. The specific overtones of these conflicts will be explored later.

#### The Department of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown in size and power since its organization in 1947. Secretary James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, believed that the Secretary should coordinate rather than administer the military establishments. His reasoning was as follows:

1. Even one single service is so complex and vast that its Commander is hard pressed to direct it.
2. An "administering" Secretary of Defense would become swamped in detail.
3. The civilian head of a military service has more authority and responsibility than he can efficiently handle.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Eugene J. Duffield, "Organizing for Defense," Harvard Business Review, September-October, 1953.







Forrestal felt that the Secretary of Defense should coordinate:

- (a) finance, (b) recruiting, (c) assignment of missions to the Services,
- (d) assignment of the Services primary responsibility for certain weapons,
- (e) composition of forces, and (f) resolution of disputes over command assignments.

Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, and the 1958 Reorganization Act, have taken the Secretary of Defense out of the business of coordinating and made him an administrator, for better or for worse. Placed upon him now are the duties of operational management and administration over the entire Department. The only restrictions on his powers are:

1. He cannot merge the military departments.
2. The change of statutory functions are subject to the review of Congress, excepting the development and use of new weapons systems, and common supply and Service activities.
3. He shall not have a single Chief of Staff, an over-all Armed Forces Chief of Staff, or any other military staff other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. The secretaries of the military departments and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may present to Congress any recommendation they deem proper.<sup>48</sup>

The gradual centralization of power, of course, has met with some resistance and conflict. The nature of the conflicts centers around loyalty, opinions of what constitutes a proper organization, the personalities involved, the present international uncertainties, communications, and conceptual skills.

#### Conclusion

The military officer is part and parcel of these arenas. First, he is a citizen. He, too, must pay taxes; and he, too, complains with the other citizens of this burden. He, too, wants more from Government in the form of

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<sup>48</sup> Armed Forces Management, loc. cit.



pay, commissaries, exchanges, social security, retirement, medical care, and other benefits. He forms a part of a public—the military public—and his voice is heard with the other citizens when the people speak. He may belong to veterans' organizations, the National Rifle Association, or other groups which pressure for special consideration. He is paid by congressional appropriations bills and Congress writes the laws governing the Secretary of Defense and his military departments. Since the President is his Commander-in-Chief, he may find that feelings of mixed loyalty influence his attitude toward the President, other executive agencies and Congress. As a member of a military establishment, he may feel that the status of his Service is being over-controlled by the Secretary of Defense, creating another internal conflict. These are real problems; these are immediate problems. Their discussion is the subject of the next chapters.





## CHAPTER IV

### THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CONFLICT

#### Introduction

The Government is the most important single factor affecting the national economy.<sup>49</sup> This has been occasioned by the demand of people for expanding government activities. The Government operates trust funds; employs one out of every six employed persons (including military); makes grants, loans, guarantees, and directs payments; provides goods and services; protects the consumer; and taxes the citizen. The military spends about half of the budget yearly.

Forty billion dollars is an amount nearly impossible to comprehend. To the businessman an organization with an annual spending budget of that amount is equally difficult to fathom. The Department of Defense yearly spends an amount equal to the total sales of 12 of the Nation's largest corporations.

In contrast to the pre-World War II era, the mechanization of war has grown by leaps and bounds. During World War II, and in such limited situations as the Korean Campaign, it was possible, by delaying tactics, to trade space for time—time to prepare; time to build; time to re-equip; time even to develop, produce, and distribute the needed weapons, while training the men to use them. The current situation accepts the premise that there may not be such an opportunity in the future. As a deterrent against action by

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<sup>49</sup>Staats, loc. cit.



our potential enemy, time has become much more precious. The current thinking holds that even time in the development stage cannot be wasted. The missile-space race places a premium on the shortest possible time lag between drawing board and issue of the newest weapons, requiring organization and precise control to accomplish.

But a conflict immediately appears. With 57% of the tax dollar going to defense, such a system must save money. The basic complaint of some Congressmen is the duplication of missile systems, the duplication of support facilities, the duplication of air fields and functions between the separate Services. In many respects it will be shown that some of these goals—time versus expense—reach toward opposite objectives. Several solutions to the organization conflict have been suggested. Before exploring them we should look at our present defense organization.

#### Organization for Defense

The Hoover Commission Reports blamed the considered policy of Secretary Forrestal for the "slow progress" under the 1947 organization.<sup>50</sup> If the Hoover Commission had considered the nature of conflicts they might have reached other conclusions. The First Hoover Commission was composed of dedicated men with broad experiential backgrounds. But they approached the executive branch with different objectives, viewed it on one small facet—organization—and then declared that Forrestal's policy had produced "slow progress." They then proposed their solutions. These solutions implied that organization was the answer and that their over-all solutions would save 3.5 billion dollars and reduce taxes 2 billion dollars. Although many of their

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<sup>50</sup> Bradley D. Nash, A Hook in Leviathan (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 111.







proposals had been accepted, the Second Hoover Commission found the Government in "bad shape."<sup>51</sup>

The trend toward centralization in the Defense Department has continued since 1947, with central administration and management slowly crystallizing in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This centralization of power, in the writer's opinion, has both advantages and limitations. These are clearly the advantages and limitations of centralization versus decentralization and the conflict of objectives inherent in discarding one system for the other.

The advantages of centralized administration are:

1. Lower expense due to the use of less-skilled personnel in subordinate positions
2. Widespread application of the unusual skills of top management
3. Regulation of quality, service, etc., through strict directives.<sup>52</sup>

Decentralization through delegated authority has the following advantages:

1. Relief of senior executives from time-consuming details
2. Increased flexibility due to decision making without waiting for approval
3. Greater interest and enthusiasm by lower levels because increased authority and responsibility yield more pride of accomplishment
4. Development of juniors for promotion to positions of higher authority.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>James W. Fessler, "Hoover Commission Reports," American Political Science Review, March, 1957, p. 153.

<sup>52</sup>William H. Newman, Administrative Action (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), chap. xii.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.



The 1958 Reorganization Act, while a centralizing vehicle, wisely did not accomplish the unification under a Chief of Staff, as the Army and some members of the Hoover Commission desired. Instead, a centralized-policy—decentralized-operations system allows the Secretary of Defense to control unified commands in a decentralized manner through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, through the Secretaries of the Departments, managerial control (policy) is centralized. Centralization of such control takes away much of the discretion, once in the hands of the civilian Secretaries, for it allows the Secretary of Defense to manipulate the development and assignment of new weapons, and logistical services as he sees fit. He also can abolish, transfer, and reassign non-combatant functions, subject to congressional objection, within 30 days after notification of Congress.<sup>54</sup>

There are major conflicts in the present organization. It should be emphasized, however, that the writer does not see the all-powerful disaster or panacea that the Hoover Commission saw in "organization." The military man should not be concerned with organization, for organization's sake alone. The real problem lies in the answer to the questions:

1. What is the law?

and,

2. Within the legal organization, what human actions can work to advance or deter sound defense?

The advantages of the present system are those of centralization. The conflicting disadvantages which, in the writer's opinion, will soon appear more evident, are:

1. Decline in the prestige and freedom to act of the civilian service Secretaries. If the Secretary of Defense should desire to dictate policy along narrow lines, the service Secretaries could be effectively bypassed. It is a well recognized concept of centralization that there is

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<sup>54</sup>U. S. Public Law 85-599.







little left to do for the intermediate levels of management, but to pass on orders from above. Thus, if the Department of Defense should issue its directives in a narrow vein, many of the benefits of civilian control-in-depth would soon disintegrate.

2. The management of the military departments would become inflexible. This was Secretary Forrestal's fear. Although such a system might effect economy by eliminating or by-passing intermediate staffs, this might be more than offset by the lost motion incurred. Communication lines would be flooded with reports and directives. Time would be lost waiting for decisions and approvals. The Office of the Secretary of Defense would expand in size and complexity.

3. Decline in interest, morale, and enthusiasm by the military departments as their authority and responsibility diminished.

4. Decline in the management ability and fitness for promotion by members of the military department. [Decision-making ability improves with exercise].

These are the obvious conflicts that can be anticipated. The less visible disadvantages will soon be discussed.

#### Civilian-Military Relationships

Regardless of what many military men unofficially proclaim, there is a real value in the civilian-control-in-depth over the military. Although familiarity may breed contempt in some relationships, the Navy has learned to respect the accomplishments of its civilian Secretaries.

Since the surrender of the Confederate Army, Grant's strategy of massive force has been employed by the American military. There has been a tendency to over-staff and get the "best regardless of the cost." Consequently, we never, during World War II, were able to match Russia or Germany in what we might call "division-efficiency." This could be defined as number of



men in uniform divided by the number of divisions in the field. Always, our service Secretaries have been the proponents of efficiency. Today, instead of the strategy of Grant, we are faced with a possible situation where we may be the underdog in industry, productivity, and resources; and will certainly be the underdog in manpower. We need to discard the strategy of Grant and study the strategy of Lee and his lieutenants. Where we lack resources, we must have resourcefulness; where we lack industry, we must have industriousness; where we lack manpower, we must have cleverness and decisiveness; and where we lack mass, we must have speed, fire-power, communications, and maneuverability.

Civilian Secretaries have long been noted for their constructive criticism of traditional military methods. Civilians forced the Navy to use steam and ironclads, the Army to mechanize, and the separate Services to recognize technical improvements. Their influence-in-depth has often forced the Services to open their eyes to the demands of the Nation. Also, the less abrupt transcendancy in communications and language from the military mind to the civilian mind has helped create better understanding. The military and the people have had fewer conflicting aims.

In most cases, this control has worked well. Unhappily, on few occasions, the loyalty paid the Secretary has not been returned. After assurances to Congress that no restrictions would be placed on witnesses in the "B-36 controversy," Secretary Matthews summarily removed Admiral Denfield for his testimony.<sup>55</sup> Such situations lead the military sometimes to adopt a skeptical attitude toward their Secretaries. Motives are involved in conflicts. The civilian Secretary comes and goes while the military man stays on. The Secretary's tenure is short which causes the military man to fear a

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<sup>55</sup>Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, "Unification and the Marine Corps," (unpublished paper), p. 158.







lack of understanding. Once understanding and trust are developed, a highly effective civilian-military combination develops. The "Military-partisan" attitude of the military man may conflict with the "administration" attitude of the Secretary. However, if the military man is assured that the Secretary is doing his best for the Country and the Service, these conflicts, unless extremely severe, should not deter an effective working relationship.

#### Other Control Conflicts

The restriction of initiative that might result from too much centralization would be a hard burden to bear. Possibly the operating forces could be partially protected from deterioration by their respective departments, but it is difficult to see how it could be completely absorbed. Just because an organization is in a "unified command" does not mean that the commander would not be restricted in his managerial actions. Nor does it mean that he would not be faced with voluminous reporting and requesting chores.

Already governmental restrictions severely limit the managerial initiative of the military. To cite only a few restrictions, the military man is strictly controlled in:

1. The classification of civilian personnel
2. The qualifications of civilian personnel
3. The ratings and his ability to promote civilian personnel
4. His ability to suspend or dismiss civilian personnel
5. The accounting system he may use
6. An auditing system that passes ex post facto judgment on his decisions
7. Space, supply, equipment and paperwork standardizations



8. Restrictive mobilization factors relating to contract placement
9. White House and congressional inquiry influences
10. The interest of the press in sensational Service accidents, willful waste, or unnecessary duplication.<sup>56</sup>

#### Inter-Service Conflicts Concerning Organization and Management

Perhaps the safest prevention of the strong military influence, so feared by the founding fathers, is the separation of Services and the oversight of Congress. Some years ago the Marine Corps fought its fight for survival. There was unmistakable evidence that without ample congressional protection that Service would have been quickly decimated.<sup>57</sup>

Congress and the President have often been irritated by inter-service conflicts. Like all other conflicts the relative merits of each proponent are hard to judge. Only the test of time and the merits of the arguments are valid. But one important and valuable attribute of conflict, in the writer's opinion, is that just as evolution causes conflict so conflict brings on evolution. For instance, out of the 1947 conflict came not unification—which was the stated purpose—but clarification of the duties of the military departments, better coordination, better staff advice to the President, and a greater degree of executive control.

Then with the tightening of the purse strings came the B-36 controversy. This was an extremely rough storm, both within and without the Service. From that controversy came the permission for the departments to undertake some separate weapons development.

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<sup>56</sup> Elmer B. Staats, comments at panel discussion at The George Washington University, Washington, D. C., April 27, 1960.

<sup>57</sup> Sulzberger, op. cit.







Some of the newer weapons of today grew out of this permission. The question of supreme importance today is: Will single control of weapons development by the Secretary of Defense allow sufficient initiative within the Services? We cannot survive a decade of orthodoxy.

Time proved that the controversy had beneficial results. I leave it to the reader to picture the Korean situation as we might have entered it without a Marine Corps and with no naval aviation.

The separation of the Air Force from the Army had different effects. Air power emerged in its proper perspective, but the lack of adequate ground support aviation techniques and airlift capabilities by the Air Force has left the Army uncovered and immobile. Perhaps the unified command system will call attention to such crying needs and foster a more cooperative spirit between forces as they begin to realize their interdependency in the working situation. It has been said that inter-service rivalries exist only in Washington. The direct chain of command from Washington to the unified command may augment inter-service cooperation.

#### The Basic Issues of Inter-Service or Extra-Service Conflicts

But should conflict reach such an extreme that it must be aired outside the Defense Department and the Services, is this bad? Is it wrong for dedicated men to disagree or to speak out against what they consider a danger to the Nation's existence? One would think it is not; yet the problem is deep and complex. These things must be considered:

##### What are the dissenter's motives?

Consider "Billy" Mitchell.<sup>58</sup> A maverick from the beginning, he proclaimed that an independent air arm was equally as efficient yet a cheaper

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<sup>58</sup>Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), chap. iv.



substitute for the Navy. He invited court martial and, although "losing the battle, he won the war."

Wartime and post-war Air Force budgets have proven Mitchell's economy arguments false. Bombing surveys have seriously questioned the efficiency argument. There is some evidence that Mitchell may have done more to retard the emergence of the Air Force as a mature arm with a balanced doctrine. The Army Air Force entered World War II with Mitchell's doctrine of "ignore the hostile army - destroy the vital centers." If we can believe the bombing surveys, we find that this theory proved to be an expensive and relatively ineffective project. The ground soldier, the Navy, the tank, and the tactical aircraft defeated the enemy. Mitchell's doctrine, however, was resurrected in the eyes of the public, with the dropping of two atom bombs over Japan.

Mitchell's doctrine survives as we enter the missile age. It is now necessary as a deterrent to war because of its unbridled savagery. Whether it will be used on a future battlefield is a grave question.

#### What initiated the dissent?

Consider General MacArthur.<sup>59</sup> In Korea he correctly stated that a "new war" had opened when the Chinese hordes plunged across the Yalu River. He demanded authority to bomb the Yalu bridges and was refused. He launched an offensive and was defeated. Whether the bombing of the Yalu bridges would have prevented this defeat will never be known. But MacArthur could not admit defeat in the field, so he placed the responsibility on his Commander-in-Chief. His return, after his relief, resembled a triumph. Imagination allows us to picture the reception he would have received had he indulged in the same recriminations after his escape from the Philippines.

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., chap. vi.







What results do the dissenters achieve?

Without doubt the badly needed reorganization of the Defense Department came about in the form of "coordination" rather than "unification" through dissent on the part of the Navy. Possibly dissenters will be needed in the future to deter the seemingly unavoidable concentration of power in the Defense Department, should such concentration unduly restrict the Services in the accomplishment of their missions.

Conflicts today are centered around missions and means; this seems to be an ever-recurring point of argument. The nuclear submarine, the space program, and the missile responsibility programs were born out of dissent that became public.

Granting that organizations must be efficient, it does not follow that a defense organization is in the business of "saving money." Defense is the business of a Defense Department. One of the most pressing arguments for reorganization advanced by the Hoover Commission was that reorganization would "save money." This is well and good, but a defense structure that saves money, but deteriorates from within, means a loss of the Country, if it cannot meet the test of combat.

A centralized organization is probably the most economical, but is it the best? The manner in which delegation is handled in such an organization determines long-run success. The present structure can be a vehicle for either success or misery for the military man, depending on the man in control.

To aid his actions and direct him with sound policy, the military man looks to his civilian Secretary. Together they can form a smooth transition from government direction to military action.

Freedom of decision is quite limited today for the military manager. He cannot exercise the amount of control necessary in supervising civilian personnel, his accounting system is strictly defined. Standardization, in



many matters, faces him daily, while political and public pressures influence his actions.<sup>60</sup>

Within the Defense Department, despite restrictive measures sometimes applied by superiors, conflicts between Services boil to the top. When they become public, changes are assuredly in the making, quite possibly for the better. Time and the public will judge the issue.

Organizations are people—conflicts involve people. Organizations do not conflict with each other, but the people within them do. Organizations are not usually the cause of conflict. The actions of people who control and work within organizations compose the fountainhead of conflict.

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<sup>60</sup>Staats, loc. cit.





## CHAPTER V

### CONFLICTS IN BUDGETING

Before the beginning of years  
There came to the rule of the State  
Men with a pair of shears,  
Men with an Estimate—

. . . . .  
And fashioned with pens and paper  
And fashioned in black and white,  
With Life for a flickering taper  
And Death for a blazing light,  
The Armed and the Civil power  
That they might endure for a span  
. . . . .  
The much administered man.<sup>61</sup>

#### The Military Mind

Foremost in the minds of the well trained military man is the big "M"—the Mission. "What is my job?" he asks. He then studies the situation and the courses of action. While doing this he analyzes the special considerations affecting the possible courses, the enemy situation, and his alternatives. Analyzing the opposing courses of action, he compares the alternatives and makes a decision.<sup>62</sup> Any plan, to obtain maximum effectiveness, to the military man must minimize the uncertainties.

#### The Uncertainty of Future War

A perplexing problem, constantly facing the military man is a lack of essential information. Both the United States and Russia are building

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<sup>61</sup>Kipling, "The Masque of Plenty," loc. cit.

<sup>62</sup>FM 101-5, op. cit., chap. vi.



and improving vast stockpiles of weapons, which conceivably neither will use. So, as Dr. Robert Oppenheimer phrased it, we are "like two scorpions in a battle."<sup>63</sup> We each have the capability of destroying the other with the knowledge that before our poison takes effect we will receive a lethal dose ourselves.

If we will not fight a nuclear war, then what? We have invented phrases such as "brush fires." We did not use nuclear weapons in Korea, but there is certainly some doubt whether that campaign could be called a "brush fire."

The military man must plan for all possible enemy capabilities. What are his own resources? This is a perplexing problem. Only at the time his appropriation bill leaves Congress can the military man estimate to what extent he can finance his planning.<sup>64</sup> Even then he must face the possibility of a conflict between the President and Congress with resultant impounding of funds originally destined for his department. The military man has learned to live with the uncertainties surrounding an enemy. The uncertainties of his own position create an anxiety that his training makes doubly difficult to bear.

#### Inter-Service Conflicts and the Budget Process

The uncertainty of his own position often causes the military man to wonder from which point his financing will be attacked. The fact that the budget will be sliced between the separate military departments naturally results in some competition between programs. This may lead one department to publicize the importance of its projects. Conflicting projects, in the financial sense, often cause a department to compare the values of its project to the values of another department's project. Sometimes this is

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<sup>63</sup> Millis, loc. cit.

<sup>64</sup> Staats, loc. cit.





similar to comparing apples and oranges. It also appears that alarming statements regarding the inadequate strength of a particular Service often reach peak intensity as budget time approaches.

#### Executive-Military Differences

The Service Secretary or military chief of a Service is in a delicate area if he feels the President's program does not adequately support the mission assigned his Service. He is faced with weighing his conception of what is essential to the defense of his country against the consequences to his Service and himself, should he publicly express his opinion.

#### Loyalty Conflicts<sup>65</sup>

The military officer need look no further than his commission to know that he is subject to the directives of the President and his superiors. He has sworn also to uphold the Constitution and defend his country from its enemies. The ultimate question facing the military man appearing before a congressional appropriations committee is: "To what extent can I express my disagreement with Presidential Policy?"

In this situation, the military officer is torn between conflicting loyalties. He is loyal to the President. He has his own conception of military needs. He also knows that the Constitution gives Congress the responsibility of providing for the common defense and raising and supporting the Army and Navy. Herein lies the conflict. As a member of an executive department he is legally bound to support the President's programs and policies but, as a professional military man, is it not his duty to advise and inform Congress, should advice and information be requested?

Congress is aware of the difficulties faced by the military officer. By examining testimony it is difficult to believe that appropriation

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<sup>65</sup>Lowell, op. cit., chap. xii.



subcommittee members could ask such pointed questions in such a tactful manner if they were not well aware of the forthcoming answers. In 1949 the chief of the Senate Committee told General Bradley:

I am not suggesting that you ask for more money, but I am suggesting that if you think you should have more money, if you will give some of the members a little tip, we will open the door for you to make such requests as we think you ought to make.

Another favorite door opener is: "Do your budget figures represent what you originally asked for?" This gives the military officer the opportunity to explain his original request without publicly stating that he disagrees with the final request. He can then be asked what prompted his original request and why it was reduced. For example:

Senator Chavez. I know that the committee is deeply interested in all branches of the military services. They are all doing a good job.

I also know that the committee as a whole feels that if there is anyone we cannot afford to be austere with, it is the Marine Corps.

#### Strength Provision in 1959 Bill

In the matter of personnel, repeating the history of the 1959 appropriation bill, we provided for 200,000 marines; is that not correct?

General Pate. You did; yes, sir.

Senator Chavez. And it was so stated in the appropriation bill itself?

General Pate. That is correct.

Senator Chavez. You were not able to utilize fully 200,000?

General Pate. No, sir.

Senator Chavez. They cut you down to 188,000; is that correct?

General Pate. Yes, sir; and then on down to 175,000.

Senator Chavez. I presume that you are acquainted with the action of this committee and also the action taken on the Senate floor with reference to this particular matter in the supplemental bill?

General Pate. Yes, sir.

Senator Chavez. The idea of the floor action on the supplemental bill is to let the Pentagon know that it was the intent of the Senate at least that it should be kept at 200,000 and that we disliked any kind of excuses that were made about it.

Now, tell us, yourself, you could use 200,000?

General Pate. Definitely; yes, sir.







Senator Chavez. What was your request when you originally prepared the budget?

General Pate. My original request was for 200,000 for the fiscal year.

Senator Chavez. Like any other marine you will take what you can get?

General Pate. Yes, sir; glad to get it.

Senator Chavez. But you would like 200,000?

General Pate. Yes, sir.

Senator Chavez. Do you think we should worry about budget matters when the world is in the condition it is and cutting down the Marines by 25,000 men, when every day they are preaching to us that something is likely to happen momentarily? Do you think that the only consideration should be budgetary, or should we think about what they say we should right now, considering the conditions in the world?

General Pate. I think the whole thing should be looked at very carefully, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Chavez. Yes, I feel budget considerations are essential and necessary. I, for one, do not think they should be considered to the sacrifice of our national security.

You do not have to answer. I think I know how the Marines feel about it.<sup>66</sup>

#### Resolving Loyalties

The military officer, faced with a conflict between his loyalty to the President, his conception of military needs, and his knowledge of congressional responsibilities, must make a personal decision.

1. He is legally and duty-bound to support the President's budget.
2. He must realize the limitations of his own concepts evaluating them against the sources of information and the opinions of other experts.
3. He must realize that others, especially the President, may have access to more information.
4. However, he is also bound legally and duty-bound to give Congress the information necessary to proper legislation. There is a fine point of law here as to what constitutes executive privilege. This point has never been completely tested.

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<sup>66</sup> U.S. Senate Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 184.



5. In giving the answers to Congress, absolute honesty is essential. Facts should be reported as facts; opinions, if requested, should be reported as such.

### The Fine Gray Line

The matter of opinion is the shadowy area. Many of our defense expenditures lie in this area. The fact that strategic bombing during World War II produced indecisive results did not stop the expenditure of billions of dollars for strategic aircraft to date. If such expenditures provided an effective deterrent, they were cheap, and would have been so at twice the price. But one of the bitterest inter-service clashes—the B-36 controversy—was a war of opinions, fought on a shadowy battleground by men with differences of opinion and the resolve to make their differences known.

Frankly, and perhaps rightly so, dissent in this gray area, by the military man, involves the risk of loss of status and the Nation's confidence. The risks are so great that only men of extreme conviction and dedication or else bold fanaticism dare speak. Legally, if the dissent is contrary to the President's program, the dissenter is out of bounds. Ethically, it is a gray area; concerning truth, the only test is the future.

The balance of risks only prompts military men, willing to accept such risks, to speak out when they feel the situation, or a proposed course of action, intolerable. They can be assured of the consideration and judgment of Congress. This consideration is mixed with skepticism, tolerance, and a desire to learn the truth. Congress is well aware of the risks involved. They realize that the executive budget is based on many Presidential considerations; they also realize their own duty to the people.

Fortunately the language of those who dissent is couched in tact, propriety, and diplomacy. For example:







Senator Chavez. May I ask if you have similar reservations as of now as the Army had yesterday?

General Pate. I have reservations.

I am not sure they correspond exactly with the Army. I am prepared to give you my reservations.

Senator Chavez. Are you prepared to give your reservations for the record?

General Pate. I am, sir.<sup>67</sup>

### Policy Conflicts

Administration policies can cause conflicts to come about within the executive branch. For example: the present administration is committed to a fight against inflation. From a 1947-1949 base, the industrial price index has risen from 113.2% in 1952 to 128.5% in October of 1959. Even the President does not deny that there has been a steady increase, but he says that it must stop. If the military departments allow for future inflation and in his requested dollars, are they not, as a member of executive departments, admitting defeat? Are they not helping defeat an executive policy? On the other hand, if a certain amount of inflation is inevitable, are they not remiss in their duties if they fail to provide for it? The word "inflation" is conspicuous due to its absence from military testimony before the appropriation subcommittees in recent years.

Unofficially, military men state today's inflation problem realistically, calling it "level-funding" (the same budget, year after year, with slow attrition of buying power due to inflation). Another term, practically synonymous, is "limited dollars."

### Relations with Congress

The military officer, testifying before Congress, usually has a proposed budget which he considers insufficient. For example:

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 186.



You may blame the War Department for a great many things. They have made their mistakes and sometimes bitter mistakes, but you cannot blame us for not asking for money. That is one fault to which we plead not guilty.<sup>68</sup>

Usually, when appearing before Congress, there is no immediate conflict. The military officer's disagreements lie farther back in the process—with the Department of Defense or the Budget Bureau. If this is the case, he looks to Congress as a possible means of getting more money. On the other hand, if Congress is disposed to trim the budget, there is conflict, but there is little recourse, except to be equipped with the best possible justification. Congress is the ultimate authority. If the House trims the budget, the military officer may go to the Senate with a reclama, attempting restoration of all or a part of the amount cut. In this case, the Senate acts in an appellate capacity. The military man usually admits defeat in the minor programs, reserving only those items considered absolutely essential for reclama.

#### Conflicts with the Bureau of the Budget

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the Bureau of the Budget as a civilian staff agency of the President.<sup>69</sup> The law charged the President with the responsibility of preparing the budget and presenting it to Congress annually. To do this it was recognized that a competent staff was essential. It took some time for the Bureau to gain the control that it has today. Once budgeting consisted of presenting a "book of estimates" to Congress. These estimates more often represented "wants" than "needs". Today, expert estimators review each item of the budget submitted by the departments. Not only does the Bureau work with budgeting, but it has other functions, one of the more important being to act as a legislative clearing house. As such, it interprets and passes on "Presidential Policy" toward proposed legislation.

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<sup>68</sup>General Douglas MacArthur, testifying at 1935 Senate Hearings.

<sup>69</sup>Marx, loc. cit.







There is no question regarding the success of the Budget Bureau in its operation. But this does not mean that success is achieved by popularity. A major area of conflict centers around the question of overlapping authority. For instance: If the Secretary of Defense considers a certain program indispensable to the Defense Department, should his policy be rendered useless through the refusal of the Budget Bureau to request sufficient funding? The Budget Bureau is hasty to declare that it does not control military policy, but its close identification to "Presidential Policy," together with the fact that its directives are issued in the shadow of the President, tend to weaken the foundation of that argument. In actuality, arbitrary ceilings have been proposed and the Budget Bureau has held to them. Who can say that this does not control military policy? When the 1958 Budget was being prepared, Treasury Secretary Humphrey touched off a major budget controversy.<sup>70</sup> He was perplexed because the expected surplus and tax cut did not come about. Military spending was going up and total spending broke through the "sonic" \$70 billion barrier on the way up. Secretary of Defense Wilson was told by Budget Director Brundage to trim his budget from \$40 billion to \$36 billion. Mr. Wilson came down to \$38.5 billion and refused to budge. This conflict was resolved by the President; Mr. Wilson won. This conflict disclosed wide areas of disagreement within the executive branch. As pointed out before, conflicts usually help to locate areas which need improvement. In this case, since the President eventually upheld Mr. Wilson, it appears that a clearer line of communication was required between the President and the Secretary of Defense on budget matters. Another point seems to be that the Budget Director was making decisions affecting military policy beyond his authority. The fact that the President, at his first news conference where the budget was mentioned, appeared to disclaim responsibility revealed that

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<sup>70</sup>Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Budget and Eisenhower," Fortune, July, 1957.





possibly the Budget Director was not keeping the President informed of differences but was relying on his own status, "in the President's shadow," to resolve conflicts.

This example serves to illustrate the prime conflict between the Budget Bureau and the military. When budget hearings are held, an estimator has to arrive at a dollar figure which will go into the President's budget. If the dollar figure is below what the department head considers essential, the estimator is accused of dictating military policy through the budget. The estimator accuses the military man of attempting to disrupt the national economy to advance his own special interest. When these conflicts arise, the estimator will win every time, unless the issue goes to the President for reconciliation. The Budget Bureau has the authority to whittle where it desires. It takes little imagination to visualize the frustration felt by the military man who knows that hundreds of little battles are lost before a big one can be won by the Secretary of Defense appealing to the President.

This is not all as bad as it might appear. The intention of this paper is to point out conflicts, but it would be unfair to declare the system invalid simply because conflicts exist. The present budgeting system has many advantages. It results in a budget better aligned with the national economy. The estimators without exception are men who have not only the best interests of the Nation at heart but also the military. An estimator in continual conflict would not last too long. The hearings are often held in conjunction with the department's own hearings which allow the estimator to get a good over-all view of the problems involved. But quite frequently conflicts do come about and the balance of power is consistently on the side of the estimator.

It is fortunate, then, that the military man gets a further chance to speak out. Before Congress, if asked the proper questions, he can state





his points of difference. But, as mentioned before, he must keep the quantity of differences to a minimum in order to maximize their importance and not be accused of "crying wolf." So the big battles are fought before the President and before Congress. The military man will usually concede the small ones in order to maintain his strength to win the larger issues.

### Conclusion

Most military men are trained to know their own position and find out as much as possible about the enemy. It seems logical for them to face the uncertainties of planning the defense of the Nation against whatever forces it may meet. However, it is frustrating to be constantly faced with the internal uncertainty as to whether their well-laid plans will be financed. Because of this internal uncertainty, the military man is prepared to defend himself against any force which might deter his plans. The force may be a sister Service, in which case he is prepared to engage in inter-service conflicts to prevent his position from being undercut.

Not only will the military man defend himself against internal conflicts, but he often finds himself in disagreement with the President or his appointed agents from the Budget Bureau. The decision to disagree openly is a weighty one, since it can quickly become a personal issue reflecting on the loyalty of the dissenter. Congress, the ultimate authority, is quick to sense conflict, and in many cases allows the matter to be discussed in such a way that it may be smoothly handled. This greatly minimizes the personal danger and resolves the conflicts in a tactful manner.

The military man is hampered by being required to accept policies, such as inflation control, which he may not believe effective. In this case he may hide the effects of inflation in the effects of other factors, such as obsolescence.



The system of budgeting brings the military man face to face with the Budget Bureau, against whom he is virtually powerless, except by appeal to the President or Congress. Because the appeal instrument becomes ineffective through frequent use, it is exercised only on the most important issues.

This, then, is the battle of the Budget. It results in an amount of money to be spent. It is the direct battle. Each year the military man wins a few and loses a few. And before he can wipe away the blood, it is time to start again.





## CHAPTER VI

### BEHIND THE CONFLICTS

#### Introduction

It is now time to skeletonize some of the current conflicts in a critical light. Dedicated men should continually examine the issues facing them in order to maximize the good results that may come out of conflicts, and minimize the unnecessary conflicts deterring good government.

#### Faults of Narrow Appraisal

Much of the control of government departments, many of the criticisms thrown at government departments, and many of the conflicts arising out of important issues, are based on improper examination. Too often the whole is judged by one or a minority of its parts. It is extremely immature to live in a world of isolated particulars when the real world consists of wholes.<sup>71</sup> Yet this sort of immaturity is seen daily in government. A recent article by Congressman Kowalski, advocating the abolishment of the separate Services,<sup>72</sup> used just such faulty logic. Only a few years before, Colonel Kowalski taught the fallacies of exercising such immature judgments to Army officers! Recently the Air Force was criticized because one of its manuals contained some questionable material regarding communism in churches and the right of the press to certain military information. The result was a new system of reviewing publications at a higher level. A mature viewpoint would have been

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<sup>71</sup>H. A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind (New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1949).

<sup>72</sup>Frank Kowalski, "Why We Must Abolish the Army, Navy, and Air Force," True, April, 1960, p. 18.



to take such action necessary to correct the isolated circumstance. General wide-sweeping changes are indicated only when a better method is patently more efficient and less expensive. Perhaps this was the case. Sometimes an isolated particular can reveal a major deficiency in a large structure, but few buildings are ever condemned because a crack appears in a plaster wall. Numerous and everwidening cracks are a different matter.

### Shall We Judge Men Or Paper?

Men exist in the flesh. Organizations exist on paper. Man's concept of the organization and his responsibilities therein determine his and the organization's effectiveness. Once an organization chart is drawn up it stays in the same form until revised. Men flow in and out of an organization and its surroundings. It is on this flow of mankind that the major judgment should fall, not on the paper structure through which they flow.

Yet the Government is paradoxically delicate in handling men. Too often is a Presidential commission, such as the Hoover Commission, prone to surrogate the responsibilities for poor results. Organizations and procedures are blamed for the poor results achieved by men and the methods of men.<sup>73</sup> Too often does an isolated case of mismanagement or a tragic accident result in widesweeping organization changes. Too seldom do governmental commissions place the blame for poor management on a poor manager.

### The Evaluation of Organization

If men are more important than paper organization, why then all this criticism of organization? Some criticism is valid. Some of the more valid criticisms are:

1. The organization is not task-organized to accomplish the objectives for which the organization is built.

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<sup>73</sup>Fessler, loc. cit.







2. The organization does not designate responsibility.
3. The organization does not provide those responsible with the necessary tools with which to do their job.
4. The organization hinders lateral and horizontal communication.
5. The organization divides over-all responsibility for the same function.
6. The organization does not take advantage of economy and efficiency.
7. The organization does not match rewards and punishment with performance.
8. The organization does not foster initiative at supervisory levels.
9. The organization does not develop men capable of assuming leadership.

These are only a few of the causes of ineffective management. Some can be traced to the actions of men who built the organization. The rest can be traced to the actions of men within the organization. But the primary theme in evaluating an organization is: "Does it aid its members to work effectively?" If it is so structured, (most of them are), and it is still ineffective, then we must look to the men who control it. It is my contention that more fault can be found in men than in the structure in which men work.

#### Limitations Imposed on Effectiveness

Behind many conflicts, particularly the civilian-military conflicts, is the frustration inherent in a situation where a manager does not have the tools properly to perform his job. These limitations are especially disconcerting if they prevent a manager from being able to control his personnel. For example, Government service is based on a reward-and-punishment structure. However, rewards and punishments are not properly correlated with performance and behavior. A recent estimate holds that in civil service positions the probability that the best worker in any sub-unit would be promoted is .60



while the probability that the worst worker would be suspended or dismissed is .10.<sup>74</sup>

When a military man is placed in a side-by-side or superior-subordinate-relationship with a civil servant, the inequality of treatment that must be accorded different workers does much to limit effectiveness. The military man knows that his future depends on performance. The civilian knows that his future is not so closely correlated.

Not only do limitations exist on performance but on classification, qualifications and ratings. Others that have been mentioned are the uncertainties of financing operations each year; accounting and measurement systems which originate outside the organization; and restrictions on space, supplies, forms, and equipment. All of these governmental limitations, while sometimes necessary for over-all government efficiency, can be so narrowly defined that the result is over-all inefficiency. This is particularly true if no consideration is given over-all performance of the organization. As Government grows it takes men of wide conception to view the whole. It is easier for men of specialized skills to narrowly appraise particulars. The problem, then, becomes one of coordinating specialized appraisals to assure that they fit the whole. Our Government faces this problem today. The trend is toward centralization in the executive branch. As the trend continues, the organization expands beyond the limits of human conception. In an attempt to regain conception, huge staffs are built up. The staffs are composed of specialists who attempt to examine isolated particulars. Other staffs are built up to coordinate the particulars and combine them into a whole capable of conception. This quest for information and attempts at proper appraisal can have such detrimental results as:

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<sup>74</sup>James N. Mosel, lecture to Navy Graduate Comptrollership Class, 11 February 1960.







1. The faults of centralization previously mentioned.
2. The necessity of requiring a constant stream of reports flowing up a communication chain which is constantly constricting.
3. The burden of reporting upon operating units.
4. The attempt of specialized appraisers to find general rules by which to measure a number of specific activities.

Many of these limitations have been imposed by businessmen who feel that the Government should be run on a "business-like" basis. The failure of so many businessmen who have been placed in positions of government responsibility does not seem to alter their beliefs.

#### Management of the Defense Department

It is still too early to determine the complete effect of the 1958 Reorganization on the effectiveness of the military departments. Certain trends, however, merit watchfulness, and possibly alarm. The most valuable asset of the Defense Department is its men in uniform. Trends which may deteriorate the effectiveness of this asset are:

1. A larger staff of specialized information-seekers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
2. Circumvention of the department Secretaries in the administrative communications chain.
3. Standardization and control to the extent that initiative and training of executives are impaired.
4. The widespread use of general measurements to specific situations.
5. Failure to coordinate instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with those to the military department Secretaries.
6. A tendency to divide responsibility, placing the blame for ineffectiveness on organizations, not men.



7. Failure to grant consideration to men who disagree within legal bounds.

8. The attempt to place restrictions upon the thoughts of men in the higher responsible positions. Men should not be required to act against what their experience, conception, and conscience lead them to believe, especially if the ultimate decision is still to be made. This is particularly true of testimony before Congress.

9. The requirement for information for information's sake alone. Vast files of information and numerous reports not essential to management can result if an organization is too responsive to congressional control. This not only hampers the effectiveness of operating agencies but deteriorates the position of the executive branch.

#### Budgeting

In the Bureau of the Budget can be found the most concentrated group of specialists who attempt through examination of particulars to concentrate these into a conceivable whole. Here, perhaps, is the most striking case of an attempt to apply a general rule to many specific unrelated functions.

Most of the conflicts between the Budget Bureau and the military lie in the divergence of objectives, the limits of conception and the measurements applied. For instance, consider a project such as warehousing. This is important to the entire operation of a military department. Statistical work measurement for budget back-up purposes measures cost-per-ton-moved. Depending on the item moved (heavy tank versus toilet paper, for example) the costs may vary from \$1.00 to \$30.00 per ton. The Budget Bureau attempts to apply a general measure (perhaps \$5.00 per programmed ton) to evaluate the budget request. Because of the failure of measurement methods, a weak link may be built into a highly dependent chain.







The failure of the Budget Bureau to recognize the future effects of inflation and the establishment of advance dollar limitations tend to create an artificial atmosphere. The military man, like Tommy, is "no bloomin' fool." He knows that his budget is limited today by the amount he received the previous year. He knows that an increase to account for future inflation or additional operational missions must be justified by deception and concealment. The Budget reviewer knows that this is taking place so he attempts to find where he is being deceived and what is being hid. In a process where honesty and forthrightness should reign supreme it seems strange that dishonesty and cleverness are so often applied.

#### Recommendations for Improvement

In order to remove restrictions which create conflict, the following areas could well be examined:

1. The possibility of aligning civilian rewards and punishments to more closely approximate performance.
2. A requirement that the performance of men be judged before enforcing organizational changes.
3. The possibility of refusal, by the executive branch, to give Congress information which is not related to effective management, congressional oversight, or proposed legislation.
4. A study of the effectiveness of general appraisal and measuring techniques when applied to specific situations.
5. Elimination of limitations which remove tools from the hands of management.
6. A general written agreement between the executive and legislative branches outlining the duties and responsibilities of the military witness before Congress.



7. An attempt to replace honesty in the budget process. Possibly the project manager concept, such as used in weapons systems, could be used. In this manner, a dollar limit could be given specific managers along with a letter of instructions. After-the-fact study of performance within the limitation would not only determine the next limitation, but the effectiveness of the manager.

8. Utilizing more effective communication.

9. Education in conception on the part of specialists.

10. If mechanization forces centralized record-keeping, new methods of interrogating electronic machines must be devised. This will eliminate reporting on information stored elsewhere.

### Conclusion

Congress and the executive branch are constantly frustrated in their attempts to achieve efficient and effective government. Much of this frustration can be blamed on their inability to accept responsibility for their actions and to hold other executives responsible for their performance. Many of the limitations imposed on managers are thwarting good management. The limitations on personnel action, for example, tend more to protect the mediocre and inefficient than to advance the excellent worker. The security of misfits seems more important than the security of the Nation.

There are many areas where a reappraisal of the value of present techniques could prove worthwhile. Foremost among these are Defense Department Organization and Management, and the Budget Process. There is need for a more honest and forthright approach in government processes. There is need for face to face appraisal of the performance of men. In spite of the restrictions under which they work, many dedicated men in Government apply these principles successfully. That they accept frustrating conditions, learning



Conclusion



to work with and use them, is remarkable. That they should be required to do so in an annually increasing amount is disgraceful. This is especially true in light of present world tensions.



## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

The toad beneath the harrow knows  
Exactly where each tooth-point goes  
The butterfly upon the road  
Preaches contentment to that toad.<sup>75</sup>

Our Government is a huge and complex machine. It is growing yearly. As it grows the conflicting aims and desires of the public grow in intensity. As these partisan forces weld themselves into stronger pressure groups, the Congress makes more demands, both formally by legislation and informally through investigation and oversight, upon the executive branch. The executive branch must cooperate with reasonable demands and resist other demands nonessential to management, oversight and legislation.

The need for closer cooperation, together with the need for reasonable resistance, requires men of broad conceptual skills, well versed in the intricacies of government. The attempts to find these men in the world of business have often been singularly unsuccessful.

Since the times require men who possess the experience and knowledge necessary to judge the instance in which they should be pliable to the will of Congress, and the instance at which they should stand firm, there is a need for tools. The tools required are those which a responsible man can use, enabling Government to hold him responsible for his actions.

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<sup>75</sup>Kipling, loc. cit.





More and more the military man finds himself holding greater responsibilities. As he is thrust more before the public judgment and his opinions become more important, there is a need for making his job easier.

The military man is not afraid of responsibility, nor is he afraid of the uncertainty of an enemy situation. However, increasing uncertainty regarding his own situation is a difficult cross to bear. The imposition of restrictions to his actions, together with increasing operational missions, make his duties doubly onerous.

The military man is willing to assume responsibility in greater quantities. He is willing to lead or be led. He will always do more than his fair share.

Honesty, forthrightness and dedication to duty are in the highest military tradition. It is unfair and intolerable to the military man to be placed in positions where he may be chastized for possessing these qualities.

The military man does not want to be a politician. The framers of the Constitution realized the danger of interjecting any influence of the military into politics. Today military expenditures so influence the economy of the Nation that the use of the military budget as a political tool is highly tempting to politicians. The extreme danger in such a design is readily apparent. Also apparent is the danger in using the defense organization as a "money saving" tool. Efficiency of management is a more acceptable term. "Saving" implies previously legislated waste.

We should be more attentive to governmental conflicts. These conflicts should be judged by their quality and the motives of the antagonists. Conflicts, which indicate a need for change, should be followed by action. Not all conflicts, however, require general correction. There is danger in applying extensive defensive measures against disagreements.



One of the best ways to eliminate conflicts is by exercise of conceptual skills and by communications. Military men, in the years ahead, must seek a broader understanding of their positions in the government processes. To the extent that they place their loyalties in the proper perspective, they will find themselves seldom engaged in conflict. To the extent that they do not attempt to engage in political matters, resisting the encroachment of politics into military affairs, they will maintain the respect of the Nation. To the extent that they protect the right to be held responsible for their actions, they will maintain the respect of their fellow officers.





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